

APPENDIX D

1. The Manitoba Royal Commission on Local Government Organization and Finance (Michener, 1964), pp. 7 - 9:

"We have asked ourselves, as our terms of reference enjoin us to do, what role local government should play in a society where communications are fast and distance is no longer a physical barrier to larger administrative units or wider social and economic interest. We have considered the effect of modern methods of communication and travel on the sense of locality and community that was the strength of local self-government, and the effect of urbanization which has proceeded so rapidly in the past few decades. The influence of increased public demand for education, welfare services and public health facilities, all of which have become increasingly the concern of provincial and federal authorities, have been taken into account . . .

The effect on local government of these and other changes raises the question of whether local government will continue to be useful and necessary in the future, or may eventually give way to decentralized provincial administration. The New Brunswick Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation (the Byrne Commission which reported in February, 1964) recommends a movement in this direction by abolishing counties, reducing municipal services to a minimum and establishing four major commissions under provincial control to administer municipal affairs, health, social services and education. Although local government as we know it traditionally seems to be a basic institution in our society, there is nothing sacrosanct about this form of administration. Like all forms of government it must constantly justify itself by its usefulness and its adaptability to changing times and manners. Legally all local corporations are creations of provincial legislation and the Provincial Legislature has complete power to abolish as well as to change them.

There is no doubt of the need and desire for reform. The evidence submitted to us and our own investigations point to these conclusions: there is still a strong feeling in Manitoba that local municipal government is vital and necessary and should be preserved . . .

We agree that the municipal corporation is still needed and that the elected councillor and school trustee should continue to play a vital role in our system of government, but we agree also that . . . what is needed is a clear-cut separation between local and provincial responsibilities so that local councils may know the exact extent of their functions and obtain the appropriate taxing powers to carry them out. Such a demarcation of responsibility and division of revenue would do much to restore the independence and vitality of municipal government. It would also strengthen provincial departments in their administration, by giving them direct control of what they must now try to achieve with municipal assistance. Voters in municipal and

provincial elections would be better informed and consequently more interested. They would know where to place the blame for an unsatisfactory service and the praise for a policy well conceived and efficiently executed. They would be better able to relate the taxes paid to each level of government to the services rendered. If a citizen has a legitimate complaint about the rate of tax levied on his real property, he should be able to make it on election day. In the present confusion of inter-governmental responsibility, the voter, although dissatisfied, tends to be apathetic as has been demonstrated by the poor turn-out of voters to elect councillors and trustees, and the numerous acclamations."

2. Harry Ashmore, Electoral Reform, Centre Magazine, January, 1969:

"If there is any real unity today among rich and poor, white and black, old and young, liberal and conservative, it must lie in the common conviction that control of government at every level has escaped them all -- and is vested in some vaguely defined establishment that functions outside the democratic process, and is inimical, if not hostile, to their interests."

3. Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London, 1957 - 60, pp. 59 - 73:

"219. Great sums of money and great effort in terms of man power are annually spent on the provision of local government services. It is essential therefore that the system of government should be one which promotes efficiency and economy in the use of both human and financial resources. There is a need for a continuous search for methods of operation which will yield the best results at the lowest cost.

220. But this is only one part of the problem of local government and it would be an error to treat it in isolation. Local government, as we see it, is not just a machine or a piece of organization, one can take each part separately and look at it separately. Local government seems to us to be much more like a living thing, an organism, in which each part or function is not self-contained or connected externally with other parts. Each part is integrally concerned with each other part. The nature and function of each part affects, and in some degree determines, the nature and function of each of the other parts. The whole is not just a conglomeration of the parts. While therefore the actual work and thought and feeling of professional administrators, elected members and electors has of necessity to be separately described, one has to remember that they do not function in separation but that each is dependent on and influences the others. In contrast to some other systems of government, representative government properly so called seeks to give outward form to the inward unity of living community. Local government is with us an instance of democracy at work, and no amount of potential administrative efficiency could make up for the loss of active participation in the work by capable, public

spirited people elected by, responsible to, and in touch with those who elect them.

221. In examining our problem we have tried always to keep simultaneously in mind these two twin matters, administrative efficiency and the health of representative government, as well as the organic relationship of both.

222. By 'local government' we mean 'local self-government'. . . . It is always necessary to bear in mind that unless local authorities are so constituted as to be able to undertake all the functions appropriate to local government there will always be the risk that more and more functions will be taken away from local government and given to ad hoc bodies or to central government.

228. When one comes to consider the appropriate size and area from the point of view of internal operation, the following factors may be of importance.

229. The main purpose of any government (and local government is no exception) is to do for people what a group of persons, elected according to law by a majority of the citizens but on election becoming representative of them all, conceive to be good within the limit of their legal powers. The assumption is that that good is something that can only be done, or can be better done, collectively. We are well aware that we have stated the main purpose of government in extremely summary terms. This subject has been one of the main matters of inquiry in the civilized world by thinkers and writers for at least 3,000 years and probably much longer. It is a very live intellectual and practical issue today. We do not offer our definition as an original contribution to thought or as an accurate summary of the accumulated knowledge or wisdom of thousands of years of thought and experience. We know that it could easily be torn to pieces as a philosophic assertion. Some of our number have already gone through this process, to the edification of the rest of us. But we feel the need of some stated objective if we are to do justice to our subject, and we feel safe in taking our definition as a very rough and ready practical guide, remembering the modesty of our purpose and its intellectual limitation.

230. This collective good-doing by local authorities can be beneficial, but it can also become oppressive. It consists partially in stopping people from doing things (e.g. throwing slops into the street), partially in forcing people to do things (e.g. sending the children to school), and partially in making people pay for services rendered whether they individually want them or not. Subject, of course, to the control of the Courts, these powers may go far in the restriction of individual freedom. Old people may be removed from home, or children from the care of their parents. It is impossible to carry out the vast range of local government services at the present day without the employment of an army of 'professions' people technically skilled in their respective activities.

231. The actual interfering with people's lives will be done mainly by the professionals; planning of services involves much work by the professionals, contacts between citizens and authorities about personal matters will be largely contacts with professionals, and the more impersonal services (e.g. refuse disposal) will be performed entirely by professionals. So good professionals are indispensable; and an important criterion of size and area is the need to attract good professionals. This in practice means that (1) there must be scope for enough of them, organized by function in proper ranks and grades: (2) there must be the possibility of paying adequate remuneration: (3) there must be enough work to give full scope for the use and development of their professional abilities: (4) the 'hierarchy' must be large enough to offer some scope for advancement or promotion, even if promotion at or near the top is usually achieved by moves from one authority to another: and (5) one must not have more posts of such importance as to require exceptional ability than one may hope to fill from the relatively small number of exceptional people upon whose existence one can safely reckon.

232. But to provide scope for a full professional life for officers is not by itself enough. There must also be proper control of professional activities, since without such control (and the stimulation that comes with it when it is wisely exercised) the view of the expert can become too narrow. Professional enthusiasm can carry the expert beyond the bounds of good judgment, and 'Bumbledom' can be a real danger. Professional zeal on the other hand can run down and need renewing by the stimulus of frequently changing contact with the representatives of the 'consumer'. The desire of the experts (except the very good ones) to get as far away as possible from amateur control, administratively and even physically, is a factor to beware of.

233. The control of the expert by the amateur representing his fellow citizens is the key to the whole of our system of government. It is probably what people have at the back of their minds when they use the words 'democracy' or 'democratic'. It is therefore important that one should find the right sort of councillor, and another criterion of size, scope and area must be 'What is best to attract good councillors?' The best professionals readily agree that they do their best work when they can rely on the informed criticism, stimulation, counsel and support of good councillors. Good professionals and good councillors need one another. Neither is likely to remain good for long without the other. The public need both, working in proper balance, each pulling his full weight in his own sphere and respecting the sphere of the other.

234. The sphere of the councillor includes these activities:

(1) He must know his people, those who have elected him, their needs, desires and fears. He must also remember that he represents not only those of his constituents who have voted for him but also those who have voted against him. Even where, as so often happens, seats are

uncontested, a councillor usually represents some who would have voted against him if they had had the chance.

(2) He must be prepared to learn enough to participate effectively in policy decisions carrying out 'compulsory' functions and in policy decisions as to the extent to which 'voluntary' functions should be undertaken.

(3) He must learn how to utilize professional advice in coming to policy decisions without becoming a slave to it.

(4) He must learn to keep away from interference in the administrative execution of policy, leaving case work to the professionals.

(5) He must maintain close enough relations with the officials and their work to enable him to form opinions as to their competence; to be satisfied that policy is being faithfully and competently carried out; and to ensure that matters involving policy are brought at the right time before the appropriate committee.

(6) He must, in the circumstances of today when politics almost universally pervade local government, act as an intelligent link between his party and the council, interpreting the one to the other.

235. It is unlikely that any form of local government will attract as councillors a very large number of people who will perform to perfection the duties mentioned in the foregoing paragraph; but a high standard of intelligence, experience, personality and character should be aimed at and can be legitimately hoped for. Indeed, in the course of our travels we have met many councillors, both men and women, amply qualified by these standards. Genuine devotion to the public good in a disinterested way exists as a motive in many instances and should be fostered. But ambition (often inextricably mixed with disinterested devotion) is a motive which can, and often does, make for efficiency in local government. Power and influence attained by long years of work, and the hope of attaining them, are things that can make both men and government tick, and ambition is not in itself a human motive to be disparaged or despised.

236. If we are to encourage a sufficient supply of councillors of ability, the scope and size of the authority on which they serve must be such that the arena in which their talents are displayed is wide enough to require (and indeed stimulate) their qualities and to satisfy their ambitions; there does seem to be some relationship between the size and scope of the authority and the capacity of the councillor and official attracted. On the other hand, it is useless to create too many 'outsize' jobs when one knows there will not be enough 'outsize' people to fill them.

237. While therefore a certain minimum size and scope of authority seems to be needed to attract councillors and officers of the right calibre, to throw them together in the right atmosphere of responsibility and so to achieve a proper balance between the amateur

and the expert, an authority of too great size and scope may tend to throw this balance out. This is for the opposite reason to that to be found in the too small authority; the balance may be thrown out if councillors have too little to do and also if they have too much.

238. If we consider the six desiderata referred to above for an ideal councillor, we can see how some of them may be impaired if the authority becomes too big.

(1) Unless the body of councillors is to be unmanageably large, each councillor will represent a large number of people spread over a wide area. If this number or area becomes too big, it is impossible for the councillor to be fully aware of their needs. He will come to rely more and more on ward meetings or other activities of his own political party, or leave all to officials. The number of people and the size of area a councillor can effectively represent naturally depend to some extent on the purposes and functions of the council on which he is elected to serve.

(2) A large council may mean large committees. Discussion at large committees resembles public debate rather than the informal conversation of a group of people seeking a solution to a problem for which they are responsible. This makes it harder for individuals to feel their personal responsibilities and encourages the growth of the practice of settling committee (as well as council issues by the party caucus in advance).

(3) To evaluate professional advice requires a knowledge of the person giving it, including the bent of his mind; and a knowledge also of the problems to which the advice is to be applied. This personal knowledge of the official is difficult in a large committee. The knowledge of a problem is hard to get if it depends on reading a vast mass of paper, some of which has not been circulated in advance. The situation involves certain dangers. The official may become supreme simply because no layman can possibly evaluate the mass of expert advice received. The officials and the committee may fall under the sway of one or more powerful personalities, good committee men who are not necessarily men of the best judgment and understanding. The committee chairman may become not merely the liaison between his committee and the officers but virtually the 'boss' of both. On the contrary a weak committee chairman may become virtually a tool in the hands of the officials.

239. There is another aspect of a councillor's possible usefulness that should be considered. While the lay councillor should not intervene in the case work conducted by the professional, he may well be of use in individual cases in a variety of ways. First, he may know (especially through his connection with voluntary associations) whether in some individual instance there is a hitherto unobserved need for some particular service. Secondly, he may get to know whether the authority's officers are doing their job adequately, efficiently and

humanely. Thirdly, he should be well qualified to know whether there is a demand or a case for the exercise by his authority of 'voluntary' functions. Fourthly, he may be useful in interpreting to his constituents the policy of the authority and the actions of its officers. Fifthly, he can be useful as a liaison between his authority and voluntary associations in avoiding overlaps or in bridging gaps. Sixthly, through knowledge of his neighbours, he may know whether a particular facility is being abused.

240. It would seem that a councillor has the best chance of being active in these six respects without becoming a nuisance to the officials, or a busybody among his neighbours, if he represents an area and a body of constituents that are neither too large nor too small for the purpose for which he represents them . . .

241. Councillors and officers both need the stimulus of public interest. This should not appear only at election times, but it would be a good thing if more electors went to the poll. At present the percentage voting is variable but fairly low. One of the good things about party politics is that they do seem to stimulate interest in elections.

242. We doubt whether any reorganization of local authority areas would have much effect in stimulating interest, though a simplification of voting procedure and a more intelligible distribution of powers among authorities might have some.

243. We do not conceive it to be any part of our duty to have regard to considerations of party politics. We accept it as inevitable that whatever recommendations we make will be scrutinized in the light of possible electoral advantage or disadvantage. The control of the local government of a capital city is a prize on which party machines are bound to cast covetous eyes . . .

280. We have borne in mind throughout the need for economy. By economy we mean economical performance of functions undertaken either compulsorily or voluntarily by a local authority, and not necessarily the mere amount of money expended in total. An efficient and economical local authority may well be one which undertakes a wider range of activities than another which has a more limited expenditure per head of population.

281. As we have said above, we are dealing with the living organism which is local government and not with an abstract scheme of administration. In the last resort, the best guarantee of efficiency and economy will be found in a healthy, active, and lively local authority which attracts good councillors and officers and achieves a right balance between their respective activities. We regard the antithesis between healthy local government and efficient administration (which has been propounded to us by a number of people) as a false antithesis.

282. We also find that comparisons between authorities in matters of economy are liable to give rise to dangerous generalisations.

On analysis one often finds that figures, apparently comparable on the face of them, are not compiled on the same basis. One finds too, that for local reasons a particular service may be more costly in one area than another. These matters are complex and each would need a rigorous and expert examination before a reliable conclusion could be reached. Many assertions have been made before us that this course or that would bring about economies, or conversely be more expensive. We have heard suggestions that one authority or another acts uneconomically in that the cost of some service is too high. We should not be prepared to accept any of these assertions without much better proof, or a far more detailed investigation than any we could make. These assertions were bandied about in many instances much too lightly.

283. Partly because reliable comparisons are hard to get and partly because within certain limits the size of an authority does not appear to be decisive, it is impossible to say that from the point of view of economy there is any optimum size of authority. It seems likely however than an authority which is strong but not too big has the best chance both of appointing good officers and at the same time of attracting good councillors who can keep in touch with their constituents.

284. There are some sources of inefficiency and lack of economy which can be isolated and identified. We refer to the overlapping of powers and functions, their unnecessary division between different authorities, and uncertainty as to the lines of demarcation between the powers of one authority and those of another. These things can and do lead to administrative friction, duplication of staffs, competition in expenditure, and waste of time. We have been constantly on the watch for these things."

4. From a brief voluntarily submitted by a private citizen:

"Our technological environment has bred a philosophy that a single large organization is much more efficient than several small organizations operating independently. This may be true where productivity is accomplished by machinery, but in a people oriented organization such as municipal government, it makes certain assumptions that should be reconsidered . . .

It seems to me that the present local government is structured in such a way that the people can feel that they have a voice in urban affairs; that any individual can talk to someone in authority; that anyone can express an opinion even though his vocabulary is not very good and he does not have a forceful manner. In the small municipalities the elected representatives are generally easy to approach and meet, and the people are not afraid to approach them. But if the elected representatives have too large an area to look after they simply do not have time to listen to people who do not have a clear, concise presentation. Nevertheless, it is extremely important that these

minorities, and others who lack the ability to express themselves forcefully, have someone to whom they can talk about law enforcement and government when they need to; someone who will do something about their problems or complaints, and if necessary will take up their case."

5. Advisory Committee on Local Government to the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, (U.S.A.), Local Government, 1959, p. 9:

"Local governments are to total government what basic tissues are to the human body. Without them, government would have no vitality."

6. Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout and Robert Warren, *The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry*, (1961) V. 55 *American Political Science Journal* 381, at pp. 837-8:

"...gargantua [the rather over-stating noun used by the authors to refer to a single city government in a large urban area] with its single dominant center of decision-making, is apt to become a victim of the complexity of its own hierarchical or bureaucratic structure. Its complex channels of communication may make its administration unresponsive to many of the more localized public interests in the community. The costs of maintaining control in gargantua's public service may be so great that its production of public goods becomes grossly inefficient.

Gargantua, as a result, may become insensitive and clumsy in meeting the demands of local citizens for the public goods required in their daily life. Two to three years may be required to secure street or sidewalk improvements, for example, even where local residents bear the cost of the improvement. Modifications in traffic control at a local intersection may take an unconscionable amount of time. Some decision-makers will be more successful in pursuing their interests than others. The lack of effective organization for these others may result in policies with highly predictable biases. Bureaucratic unresponsiveness in gargantua may produce frustration and cynicism on the part of the local citizen who finds no point of access for remedying local problems of a public character. Municipal reform may become simply a matter of 'throwing the rascals out.' The citizen may not have access to sufficient information to render an informed judgment at the polls. Lack of effective communication in the large public organization may indeed lead to the eclipse of the public and to the blight of the community.

The problem of gargantua, then, is to recognize the variety of smaller sets of publics that may exist within its boundaries. Many of the interests of smaller publics might be properly negotiated within the confines of a smaller political community without requiring the attention of centralized decision-makers concerned with the big system. This task of recognizing the smaller publics is a problem of 'field' or 'area' organization. The persistence of bureaucratic unresponsiveness in

the big system, however, indicates it is not easily resolved. Large scale, metropolitan-wide organization is unquestionably appropriate for a limited number of public services required in a metropolis."

7. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 1961, pp. 422-3:

"The larger, the more impersonal, the more incomprehensible big-city government becomes, and the more blurred in the total localized issues, needs and problems become, the more attenuated and ineffectual becomes either citizen action or citizen supervision. It is futile to expect that citizens will act with responsibility, verve, and experience on big, city-wide issues when self-government has been rendered all but impossible on localized issues, which are often of the most direct importance to people."

8. Professor R. C. Bellan, *One big city not the answer to Metro problems*, *The Winnipeg Tribune*, September 8, 1969:

"If there is one iron rule in government it is that the bigger the unit of administration the greater the wastefulness. Inevitably a big governmental body becomes top-heavy with administrative and clerical staff; inevitably it adopts bureaucratic rules and procedures that are often ludicrously inappropriate, inevitably executives build and maintain personal empires; inevitably a host of functions are performed that the public no longer wants and perhaps never wanted.

That such conditions develop is no reflection on the individuals involved; any normal person on the staff of a large governmental organization would respond in the same way to the opportunities and the pressures it generates. These wastes that occur in a large governmental unit, simply because of its size, go a long way toward nullifying whatever advantages it enjoys because of that size; they may well offset them altogether."

APPENDIX E

The problems besetting local government in 1959 as the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission saw them in Chapter XVIII of its Report:

- (i) Inequitable Distribution of Municipally Collected Revenue.
 - (a) Revenue from Industrial and Commercial Firms
 - (b) Revenue from Federal and Provincial Property
- (ii) Inequitable Distribution of Financial Burdens among Municipalities of the Metropolitan Area.
 - (a) Streets and bridges
 - (b) Public Recreational Facilities
 - (c) Social Welfare Costs
 - (d) Dyking Costs
- (iii) Wasteful Duplication.
 - (a) Garbage Dumps
 - (b) Water Pumping Stations
 - (c) Engineering Equipment
- (iv) Undesirable Location of New Industry and Housing.
 - (a) Servicing of Land
 - (b) Undesirable Location of Industry
 - (c) Tax Concessions
 - (d) Ribbon Development
- (v) The Public Less Efficiently Served.
 - (a) Fire Protection
 - (b) Police Protection
 - (c) Traffic Control
 - (d) Location and Constitution of Main Thoroughfares
 - (e) Library Services
- (vi) Water Supply and Sewage Disposal.
- (vii) Lack of Organization Responsible for Dealing with Problems Which Affect Greater Winnipeg as a Whole.

APPENDIX F

The Commission considered the following groupings of municipalities as modifications of the present status quo under Chapter VIII, 1. (c) - drawings illustrating the groupings are attached to this Appendix:

1. Three Cities - using the Red and Assiniboine Rivers as dividing boundaries; a variation on this three city concept could maintain Winnipeg Ward 1S and 3E with the rest of the City of Winnipeg north of the Assiniboine and west of the Red Rivers.

2. Four Cities -
- (i) Winnipeg, Wards 1S, 1N, 2, 3W
West St. Paul
Old Kildonan
West Kildonan
 - (ii) St. James-Assiniboia
 - (iii) Tuxedo
Charleswood
Fort Garry
 - (iv) East St. Paul
North Kildonan
East Kildonan
Winnipeg, Ward 3E
Transcona
St. Boniface
St. Vital

OR

- (i) Winnipeg, Wards 1N, 2, 3W
West St. Paul
Old Kildonan
West Kildonan
- (ii) St. James-Assiniboia
- (iii) Tuxedo
Charleswood
Winnipeg Ward 1S
Fort Garry
- (iv) East St. Paul
North Kildonan
East Kildonan
Winnipeg Ward 3E
Transcona
St. Boniface
St. Vital

3. Five Cities -
- (i) Winnipeg, Wards 1N, 2, 3W
West Kildonan
Old Kildonan
West St. Paul
 - (ii) St. James-Assiniboia
 - (iii) Tuxedo
Charleswood
Fort Garry
Winnipeg Ward 1S
 - (iv) St. Boniface
St. Vital
 - (v) East St. Paul
North Kildonan
East Kildonan
Winnipeg Ward 3E
Transcona

OR

- (i) Winnipeg, Wards 1S, 1N, 2, 3W
West St. Paul
Old Kildonan
West Kildonan
 - (ii) St. James-Assiniboia
 - (iii) Tuxedo
Charleswood
Fort Garry
 - (iv) East St. Paul
North Kildonan
East Kildonan
Winnipeg Ward 3E
Transcona
 - (v) St. Boniface
St. Vital
4. Six Cities -
- (i) Winnipeg, Wards 1S, 1N, 2, 3W
 - (ii) St. James-Assiniboia
 - (iii) Tuxedo
Charleswood
Fort Garry
 - (iv) West Kildonan
Old Kildonan
West St. Paul

- (v) East St. Paul
Winnipeg Ward 3E
North Kildonan
East Kildonan
Transcona
- (vi) St. Boniface
St. Vital
- 5. Seven Cities -
 - (i) Winnipeg, Wards 1S, 1N, 2, and 3W
 - (ii) St. James-Assiniboia
 - (iii) Tuxedo
Charleswood
Fort Garry
 - (iv) West St. Paul
Old Kildonan
West Kildonan
 - (v) East St. Paul
North Kildonan
East Kildonan
 - (vi) Transcona
Winnipeg Ward 3E
 - (vii) St. Boniface
St. Vital


A variation of this concept could put Winnipeg Ward 3E with East St. Paul, North Kildonan and East Kildonan, leaving Transcona by itself.

- 6. Eight Cities -
 - (i) Winnipeg, Wards 1S, 1N, 2, 3W
 - (ii) St. James-Assiniboia
 - (iii) Tuxedo
Charleswood
 - (iv) West St. Paul
Old Kildonan
West Kildonan
 - (v) Fort Garry
 - (vi) St. Vital
 - (vii) St. Boniface
 - (viii) East St. Paul
North Kildonan
East Kildonan
Winnipeg Ward 3E
Transcona

One variation of this concept could put Winnipeg Ward 1S with either Tuxedo and Charleswood or Fort Garry; another variation could keep Tuxedo, Charleswood and Fort Garry together with or without Winnipeg Ward 1S, while splitting up group (viii) along the lines of the Seven Cities concept.

7. Nine Cities -
- (i) Winnipeg, Wards 1S, 1N, 2, 3W
 - (ii) St. James-Assiniboia
 - (iii) Tuxedo
Charleswood
 - (iv) West St. Paul
Old Kildonan
West Kildonan
 - (v) Fort Garry
 - (vi) St. Vital
 - (vii) St. Boniface
 - (viii) East St. Paul
North Kildonan
East Kildonan
 - (ix) Transcona
Winnipeg Ward 3E


One variation of this concept could put Winnipeg Ward 3E with East St. Paul, North Kildonan and East Kildonan, leaving Transcona by itself; another variation could put Winnipeg Ward 1S with either Tuxedo and Charleswood or Fort Garry.




METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG

LEGEND

- MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES
- - - METROPOLITAN CORPORATION BOUNDARY
- ADDITIONAL ZONE BOUNDARY
- NOTE: WHERE THE RIVERS DO NOT CONSTITUTE A MUNICIPAL BOUNDARY THEY ARE SHOWN DOTTED
- PROPOSED CITY BOUNDARY




ONE CITY PLAN




METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG

LEGEND

- MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES
- - - METROPOLITAN CORPORATION BOUNDARY
- ADDITIONAL ZONE BOUNDARY
- NOTE: WHERE THE RIVER'S DO NOT CONSTITUTE A MUNICIPAL BOUNDARY THEY ARE SHOWN DOTTED
- PROPOSED CITY BOUNDARY




TWO CITY PLAN




METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG

LEGEND

- MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES
- - - METROPOLITAN CORPORATION BOUNDARY
- ADDITIONAL ZONE BOUNDARY
- NOTE: WHERE THE RIVERS DO NOT CONSTITUTE A MUNICIPAL BOUNDARY THEY ARE SHOWN DOTTED
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
EIGHT CITY PLAN



METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG

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NINE CITY PLAN

APPENDIX G

The Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission Report, 1959, pages 241 - 247.

Summary: The General Case for Metropolitan Administration

The foregoing pages have listed, in summary fashion, the arguments in favor of organizing each of the various local government services upon a metropolitan basis. Common themes appear in all. The case for the "metropolitanization" of any service is based on the general grounds that:

(a) A larger administrative unit will be technically superior to the present small administrative units. It will be able to use more specialized personnel and equipment, and the larger scale of its operations will enable important economies to be achieved.

(b) By having a service provided by a single authority, effective co-ordination is assured. At present, because each municipality administers its affairs independently, a good deal of waste, duplication and mutual frustration develops, simply because their efforts are not co-ordinated.

(c) With services provided by a metropolitan authority, the cost would be more equitably distributed. At present citizens of one municipality are able to take advantage of facilities maintained in other municipalities without contributing to their cost. Citizens of one municipality may be obliged to bear by themselves burdens which properly should be borne by the metropolitan community as a whole. Some facilities, which the community badly needs, are not being built, primarily because no means exist whereby their cost would be equitably distributed.

The Case Against Metropolitan Administration

While these are powerful arguments in favor of large-scale metropolitan administration of public services, there are powerful counter arguments in favor of small-scale administration of the same services by independent municipal corporations. Proponents of the latter urge that, in fact, small-scale administration is likely to be more economical, and satisfy more closely the desires of the public. The officials, elected and appointed, of a small municipality are likely to be more closely familiar with the detailed needs of their people. In a large municipality where interests and needs are diverse, the administration of a public service may represent a compromise which pleases no one. In a small municipality, administration can be tailored to meet the specific needs of the local community; there is no need to accept less satisfactory procedures in order to compromise with other communities.

Administration in a small municipality is likely to be more flexible, more responsive to the demands and complaints of citizens. People can communicate directly with a person in authority who can deal with their problem himself. In a large municipality, citizens who wish to register desires or grievances can generally only approach subordinates, or must become lost in a maze of red tape. The officials of a large organization are bound by rigid

rules, and these may inhibit them from dealing appropriately with unusual cases. Deviation from the rules is especially dangerous in a large municipality because it may open the door to a host of new demands, many of them undeserving.

In a large municipality it is all too easy for the number of hired staff to become excessive. Superfluity is less easy to detect, and, even if detected, the pressure for its elimination is not so great. A departmental head may be reluctant to discharge personnel whose services are not required; it is not his money which pays their salaries, and his status furthermore is supported in part by the size of his staff. In a small organization on the other hand, superfluous staff shows up glaringly. The people who hire staff are also the people who must secure from the taxpayers the money to pay them; if they allow staffs to become excessive, they face trouble from the electors. The question of status of department heads does not arise. An excess of staff is particularly likely to develop where the volume of work to be done varies from season or from year to year. Personnel actually required when operations are at a peak level are retained when the volume of work drops off and they are no longer really needed.

A large unit of government tends inevitably to provide more services than are really required by the community. A particular service may indeed be helpful to a small minority. But in a large, democratically controlled organization it is frequently impossible to provide a service only to some minority group. If the service is to be provided, a routine must be established, and this routine must apply generally to the whole community. Democratic pressure is likely furthermore to bring about extension of a service to all, which is really needed only by some; on the grounds of equity, those who do not need the service will demand equality of treatment with those who do. The larger a community is, the larger the number will be of different, specialized services, each of which is really required by only a few, but which tends to be extended to all.

The fact that a single department administers a service does not necessarily guarantee complete co-ordination of effort. Personality clashes and personal rivalries are common in large organizations and these may seriously diminish its efficiency of performance. The large, centrally controlled organization may *appear* more efficient, primarily because it is more successful in the concealment of inefficiency. The discipline imposed on members of a large organization generally succeeds in concealing weaknesses and limitations. The weaknesses and deficiencies of a large number of independent, competing, small organizations cannot be concealed, because it is not possible to restrain the criticism of people who know what is going on. It may be that, in some fields, the main advantage which the large organization has over the small, is its superior capacity to conceal inefficiency.

The Alternatives in Metropolitan Administration

If, having regard to both the pros and cons, it appears best that each of a number of public services should be administered on an area-wide basis for the metropolitan community as a whole, a fresh set of questions emerges.

Should each service be administered by its own independent authority, composed of representatives of the municipalities involved? Or should a single metropolitan authority be established to have jurisdiction over *all* services being administered on an area-wide basis, this authority being composed of representatives of the municipalities concerned? Or should existing municipalities be dissolved, and a new City be established to include the entire metropolitan area?

Individual Metropolitan Boards

Adoption of the first course would preserve in greatest measure the autonomy and independence of the existing municipal corporations. The inter-municipal boards which exist today would be maintained; possibly some could have their powers extended; perhaps several additional such boards could be established, each to handle a specific service not now administered on a metropolitan basis. This course would involve the least disruption of our present arrangements for local government. Each municipality would retain its complete independence, and its right to run its affairs as it chose. In a matter where area-wide co-ordination was required, it would co-operatively participate with other municipalities in the administration of the particular service involved.

What are the disadvantages of such a course, i.e. of our present situation?

FIRSTLY

Although there is co-ordination in the administration of some services, there is no co-ordination of all the services together. This simply means that each board or commission administers its own service disregarding other services or possibly their prior need.

SECONDLY

Greater Winnipeg has had a multiplicity of boards and commissions for many years, and still finds itself in the position today where the appointment of an investigating body became necessary, to find solutions to existing *inter-municipal* problems. This, of itself, must be accepted as sufficient proof that the various independent administrative bodies were incapable, by their very nature, to resolve all the difficulties. Indeed, the municipalities, other than the City of Winnipeg, in their final brief to the Commission recommended that a central co-ordinating authority be established for a number of services, some of which are now being handled each by a different board or commission, *and this request came from municipalities who are members of some of these same boards!* (see Page 44 of final submission on behalf of a majority of the Municipal corporations).

THIRDLY

A single authority is needed which can speak and act on behalf of Greater Winnipeg as a whole. New problems constantly emerge which concern the entire metropolitan community; no organization is in being

which is responsible for dealing with them. A heroic attempt at leadership is required of someone on each occasion to bring into being, usually belatedly, an ad hoc organization to tackle each such problem which develops.

Merely to have a number of metropolitan administrative boards does not serve the purpose. Administrative boards are not genuinely responsible bodies, selected by the public and having as their responsibility the well-being of the metropolitan community. Their function begins and ends with the administration of a particular service or facility. They cannot be blamed for failing to take action outside their assigned spheres of responsibility; they may not have the knowledge or the necessary authority. But often complicated situations develop which have many ramifications and cannot be adequately handled by a number of separate authorities, each of which is responsible for only one aspect of the problem. What is required is a single body which will be responsible for the *whole problem*, and will have the authority to take or to compel all action necessary to deal properly with the problem.

An Overall Metropolitan Authority

If it seems best to bring into being an authority responsible for the general well-being of the metropolitan community as a whole, a choice must be made. The authority could take the form of a metropolitan council, composed of representatives of the various municipal councils, and empowered to administer all those services which were of concern to the area as a whole, or it could take the form of a single City Council for the entire area, all of the municipalities having become amalgamated into one city.

Each of the two alternatives has its distinct merits; each has its draw-backs. The metropolitan form of government would retain the advantages of administration of many services on a small scale, since small municipal organizations would continue to function. Metropolitan administration would, however, be in effect for all those services which were best handled on a metropolitan basis.

With a number of independent municipal organizations functioning in the Greater Winnipeg area, citizens would enjoy some of the benefits of competition in the field of public administration. The services provided in one municipality could be compared with those provided in another. An outdated or ill-conceived policy maintained through inertia in one, would be exposed by the imaginative and progressive procedure adopted in another. A number of channels would exist whereby men and ideas could come to the fore in the field of local government. Multiplicity of administrations may bring some problems, admittedly, of duplication, of inadequate co-ordination, of operations on an inadequate scale; but these draw-backs are not an excessive price to pay for the maintenance of vigorous, independent administrations, each of which is able to order its affairs in its own particular way, meeting best the needs of its own community, providing alternatives and a variety of choices to suit the diversified needs and desires of the metropolitan community.

It may be further argued that the small or moderate sized municipality is able to attract into local public office able and worthy people who would not consider entering into the public life of a large city. The avenues to public office in a small municipality are easy and informal; the holders of public office are not subject to the same fierce glare of publicity: An aspirant to local office need not be a "politician", obliged to engage in strenuous political campaigns, or obliged to join some political organization in order to obtain its material support. Small municipal organizations offer the only acceptable avenues to public office for a good many worthy people. Also, with administration conducted by small organizations we have many more people in public office, which is in itself not undesirable; it is a good thing in a democratic society to have a large number of citizens actively participating in the administration of public affairs, bearing the responsibility of public office.

The citizen of a small municipality tends to feel a greater sense of responsibility, demonstrated in willingness to contribute time and effort toward the needs of the community. The Community benefits from the services of the individual, freely given, and the individual derives gratification from his sense of communal participation. The large municipality cannot evoke the same response; its citizens do not feel an equal sense of responsibility; its operations are too large and formalized to be able to make an equal use of the contributions of individual citizens.

Amalgamation of Greater Winnipeg into One City

The only other alternative would be to unite the whole area into one city, as was very ably and strenuously argued by counsel for the City of Winnipeg.

Admittedly, there are compelling reasons for this suggestion. After all, with a present population of about 420,000 people, Greater Winnipeg can still only be compared to an average modern city in size, so that even as one city Winnipeg will hardly be placed in the category of cities which are "too big".

The members of a city council, elected to represent either wards or the city at large, it might be argued, would give better representation and handle city-wide problems more efficiently than would a metropolitan council, with each municipal representative on such a council interested in his own bailiwick.

It could also be argued that a metropolitan authority would result in some over-lapping and duplication, which would not happen in one city administration.

Another argument in favor of one city rather than a metropolitan authority would be that a metropolitan council would eventually handle so many of the services, that there would be very little left for the local councils to do, and these would eventually disappear by sheer lack of interest on the part of the community in local affairs - then why the delay in achieving the inevitable result?

There is no attempt made here to exhaust the pros and cons for each alternative, or to assess the many discussions for or against each course which engaged the Commission. All that is intended by the above is to give the reader a brief summary of the various alternatives which presented themselves as worthy of consideration, and to refute any suggestion that the various solutions suggested in the public hearings were not considered. In short then, the alternatives considered were as follows:

1. Leave the situation as it is, with the appointment of more boards and/or commissions when deemed necessary.
2. Co-ordinate the various boards or authorities now in existence under one body, with the powers of each board transferred to such central body.
3. Establish a metropolitan authority with jurisdiction over specifically designated services, and leave local functions to the municipalities themselves, and the elimination of all boards.
4. Formation of one city under one city council.
5. A further alternative was a possible combination of some of the above or parts thereof.

Municipal and School District Boundaries

Whichever of the alternative courses of action is adopted - the present municipal and school district boundaries may have to be re-arranged. The present municipal boundaries came into being through circumstances which have ceased to exist. As described in Chapter IV, the present municipalities developed out of the original parishes which straddled the Red and Assiniboine Rivers. During the decade prior to World War I the difficulty of communication across a river caused the municipalities to split in two along the river barrier. Shortly after the end of World War I further divisions occurred when urban and rural residents found it impossible to live together harmoniously under one local administration.

All those elements which determined the location of the present boundaries have vanished, or will vanish in the near future. The parish divisions have no significance today; additional bridges now span the Red and Assiniboine Rivers in the Greater Winnipeg area, and more are to be built; the rural communities which organized as separate municipalities because they could not live under one local government with urban communities, have now become heavily or partially populated by urban residents who commute to Winnipeg. The general availability of automotive transportation has made possible effective administration over a wide area, removing a limitation which previously restricted the optimal size of administrative units.

It is true that the present boundaries have been in effect since the early 1920's, a full generation ago. It might therefore be claimed that although they may be physically outdated, nevertheless the fact that they have been in existence for so long has given rise to strong sentimental attachments. The fact is, however, that in practically all the suburban municipalities long time

residents today constitute only a minority. Most of the municipalities have acquired the greater part of their existing population in the past decade, the majority of the newcomers were previously residents of Winnipeg or another suburb. They settled where they did, not because of deep rooted attachments, but because they found the house and surroundings which suited them best. A revision of the present boundaries of municipalities might make possible more rational and effective administration; it should not be considered unthinkable on the grounds that it would violate the deep-rooted attachments of a great many people.

If a metropolitan government were established, or if even the status quo were retained, it might also prove advisable to amalgamate some of the smaller municipalities into larger administrative units. Although the small municipality has its advantages, it can, like many good things, be overdone. A municipality may be altogether too small to provide efficiently the services required by a modern urban community. Furthermore, the task of metropolitan administration would be complicated and aggravated if a large number of small municipalities would each have representation upon a metropolitan authority. The orderly expansion of the metropolitan area would be rendered more difficult to achieve if an excessive number of small independent jurisdiction all had to be reckoned with.

The boundaries of our school districts are also, as indicated in Chapter V, related to events of a distant past which have no significance today. Many of the school districts operating in the metropolitan area today are too small to perform effectively. As has already been indicated, they cannot employ, or make good use of, specialist teachers. They cannot provide a reasonable range of options and facilities.

Another boundary issue must be considered. While the administration of the metropolitan community must be confined within rational, clearly-defined boundaries, there must be some form of liaison with, or control over, authorities of the surrounding area. Developments may occur just outside the metropolitan boundaries which may be prejudicial to the interests of the metropolitan community. Provision must be made whereby the community's authorities have the power to prevent such developments from taking place.

There is no hard and fast rule by which to define an area or a city as being of the optimum size in order to achieve the maximum in efficiency, economy and service. The Commission endeavoured to obtain an acceptable yardstick, but was finally driven to the conclusion that it would have to establish its own opinion as to the desirable size of the area or any unit thereof.

The Commission is of the opinion that each "metropolitan problem" must be judged on its own merits, and that a solution which may be acceptable in one instance, may not necessarily be acceptable in another.

In the case at hand, the Commission arrived at its conclusions based on its own intimate knowledge of the problems, and on the evidence and statistical information which was available and used its own judgment in arriving at what it hopes will be a practical and useful area for effective co-ordination of services, as well as ample "breathing-space" for the present population, and planned expansion for many years to come.



1870 MANITOBA CENTENNIAL 1970